This paper presents an econometric approach to the evaluation of environmental regulation using tradable property rights. Existing empirical research on this issue, which compares overall industry efficiency before and after the introduction of new regulations, conflates two distinct phenomena: efficiency changes due to exit of excess capital, and changes in the efficiency of individual firms. Because the regulatory process induces firms of different types to enter and exit the industry at different rates, the true efficiency and equity effects of tradable property rights cannot be assessed without correcting for these changes in sample composition. This paper examines the impact of regulatory change in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery, using an econometric model that separates its effects on industry structure and vessel efficiency. The analysis finds that, contrary to widely held belief, tradable property rights did not disproportionately benefit either large fishing firms or highly integrated firms. 
INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the impact of regulatory change -in this case, the implementation of tradable property rights -on efficiency in a resource-based industry. We find that simply measuring industry-level changes in efficiency obscures both the change in efficiency of production and the distribution of efficiency gains. In particular, industry-level change can result from changes in the efficiency of individual productive units, or from changes in the composition of the industry. We show that rent-seeking behavior of firms will change the composition of the industry prior to policy change, and that this shift will upwardly bias estimates of efficiency change. By analyzing panel data with firm identifiers, this paper empirically demonstrates rentseeking behavior during policy negotiations and estimates the distribution of efficiency gains over industry participants.
Economic theory establishes that a given environmental standard can be met at a lower cost under well-defined tradable property rights than under traditional command-and-control regulation.
1 Significant recent research has empirically evaluated tradable property rights systems in areas such as the U.S. Acid Rain Program 2 and more recently in U.S. fisheries 3 .
However, in measuring the impact of policy change, it is necessary to account for the behavioral response of regulated firms to the design of the new policy. Rent-seeking behavior has been (2000) . 3 An extensive analysis includes R. Quentin Grafton et al., Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 38 J. Law & Econ. 679 (2000) . The authors measure change in efficiency using three different random samples in the British Columbia halibut fishery. The years in which the samples were taken include 1988 (the year a small group of fishermen requested individual fishing quotas), 1991 (the first year of a trial program), and 1994 (the second year that the quotas were tradable).
documented in the case of tradable emissions permits; 4 this paper looks at analogous behavior in response to the design of tradable property rights. The results demonstrate that firms' forwardlooking behavior biases estimates of both the change in efficiency of vessel production and the distribution of these gains across firm and vessel types.
While command-and control regulation of fisheries often produces tremendous overcapitalization and inefficient use of capital, 5 tradable property rights are predicted to eliminate inefficient vessels and increase the efficiency of remaining capital 6 . In the long run, tradable property rights should result in the cost-minimizing fleet; therefore, their effectiveness can be measured by comparing levels of efficiency under the competing policy approaches 7 .
Carefully measuring the impact of this strategic behavior is especially important given current policy debates over tradable property rights systems. However, measuring relative efficiency is complicated by the effect of incentives during the policy negotiations that precede the implementation of tradable property rights. In commercial fisheries, property rights have 4 See Paul. L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J. Law & Econ. 37 (1998) and Juan-Pablo Montero et al., A Market-Based Environmental Policy Experiment in Chile, 35 J. Law & Econ. 267 (2002) . 5 Gear restrictions, trip limits and limits on the number of allowed fishing hours are often met with increased capital in the fishery. A classic case is the halibut fishery, in which increasingly strict command-and-control regulations were circumvented by increasing capitalization. At the peak capitalization the entire year's allowable harvest could be harvested in a single day, commonly referred to as the Halibut Derby. 6 For a comparison of labor productivity across fisheries with differing property rights structures see Richard J.
Agnello and Lawrence P. Donnelley, Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18 J. Law & Econ. 521 (1975) . Additional reviews of property rights in fisheries include Keith E. Econ. 572 (2002) . This study uses a larger panel of vessels as well as unique firm identifiers, making it possible to evaluate the efficiency change by type of firm (integrated or independent).
historically been allocated a gratis based on the total past harvests of boats, 8 a principle that is likely to be incorporated into national legislation. As a result, firms that foresee a policy change will adapt their current behavior to maximize their benefits under the new policy 9 .
Political debate has surrounded the economic evaluation of the industry studied in this paper, the Mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery 10 . The resulting controversy over the distribution of gains and losses from policy change in this and other domestic fisheries has dominated the national debate, frustrated attempts to introduce policy alternatives, and led to lawsuits against the regulatory agency 11 .
The econometric issues involved in measuring growth of efficiency and distribution of these gains over types of firms are similar to those involved in identifying the relationship between firm size and firm growth, beginning with Gibrat; however, attrition of firms can lead to sample selection bias if the disturbance of the selection equation is correlated with the disturbance of the growth equation 12 . This paper explores the consequences of policy-induced attrition in estimating efficiency gains on the vessel level. In addition, this paper examines how behavior prior to the policy change exaggerates the potential for sample selection bias.
There is ample evidence that tradable property rights are not implemented as an exogenous shock, but are anticipated by fishing firms and incorporated into their economic Sea Watch International, et al. v. Secretary of Commerce, 762 F. Supp. 370 (1991) and Alliance Against IFQs, et al. v. Secretary of Commerce 84 F.3d 343 (9thCir. 1996) . The plaintiffs in Sea Watch International, et al., v. Robert Mosbacher argue that the property rights system violated the national equity and fairness standard, National Standard Four of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, because it is intended to drive a particular group of individuals -single vessel owners and small fleet owners -out of fisheries. 12 Bronwyn Hall, The Relationship Between Firm Size and Firm Growth in the US Manufacturing Sector, 35 J. of Industrial Econ. 583 (1987) . decisions 13 . This anticipation of policy reform produces three effects: re-entry into the industry by marginal firms to "stake their claim" for quotas; increased effort in order to increase the size of that claim; and a spike of exits after policy change. This adaptive behavior determines both the relative efficiency of vessels in the fishery and the types of firms (vertically integrated, horizontally integrated, or independent) that make up the industry. As a result, simply comparing mean efficiency levels before and after policy change suffers from sample selection bias, because strategic behavior affects the composition of the industry and hence the sample.
This paper shows the direction and scale of this bias when measuring changes in efficiency, and estimates mean efficiency change after correcting for sample selection. In addition, it identifies what types of vessels and firms gain the greatest benefits from tradable property rights.
II. THEORETICAL MODELS OF SAMPLE SELECTION
This section presents two alternative models of firm behavior under property rights implementation: one in which firms do not play a role in policymaking, and one in which they
do. These models demonstrate two points: first, participation in the regulatory process changes the composition of the industry prior to policy change; and second, firms that remain in the industry after policy change are systematically different from those firms that do not. Mean aggregate efficiency under the two polices is driven primarily by the composition of the fleet; only after correcting for strategic behavior and sample selection is it possible to estimate the change in efficiency of individual vessels.
Because this paper is concerned with forward-looking firm behavior, complications such as uncertainty, stochastic population, and so on are disregarded in favor of specifically relevant behavior. A common approach to limiting capital in fisheries is to ration licenses or permits to 
( ) 1 (,,)() iiii LpHExqcEEE λ =−−− Activity in the industry is then determined by a firm's short-run choice of the optimal level of effort and the firm's long-run choice of the optimal level of capital (vessels). A vessel will harvest if it can cover its minimum average variable cost, i r ; otherwise the optimal level of effort will be zero. Thus, in the short run, the fishing firm maximizes its current net revenue taking the population and price of fish as given, which yields the following first order condition:
EpHExqr 17 In the dynamic setting the change in the population of fish is driven by the difference between the growth rate of the population and the aggregate harvest over all vessels. Note that as in the open access case, each vessel does not take into account its harvest on the total impact on the population of the fish. Here we are not comparing the social optimum to the industry outcome, but industry outcomes under alternative regulations. 
12 ... n rrr ≤≤≤ Conditions (4) through (7) describe the fishery under command and control regulation limiting both capital and effort. The standard fishery model differs under tradable property rights, because the regulatory constraint is not on inputs (effort and capital) but rather on outputs. The vessel's total harvest must not exceed the vessel's allocated quota (8), where the total harvest quota, Q , is the sum of each individual vessel's harvest quota.
Once the market for quotas is established, there is a price, m , for a unit of harvesting quota. The price per unit of quota can be interpreted as the opportunity cost incurred by using the quota to harvest rather than selling it to the next vessel. The property right to harvest then becomes an additional capital asset to the firm. The vessel's choice of effort level under transferable property rights is a modification of (4):
The total number of vessels actively harvesting is determined by the re-entry/exit condition, which differs from (5) by the opportunity cost of holding the quota rather than selling it at price m . This is the standard model of a fishery under command and control and under tradable property rights. In contrast, the next section extends the standard model by allowing firms to be aware of policy negotiations and impending policy changes, with implications for both firm behavior and overall fleet composition.
B. Scenario Two: Anticipated Policy Change
The previous section demonstrates that the efficiency of the inframarginal firm depends on the current period's policy instrument, where the change in efficiency is a discrete event at the time of the policy change. This section focuses on the period preceding actual implementation of tradable property rights, involving lengthy negotiations and significant industry participation in policy design and approval. Although economists envision initial distribution of property rights via auction, regulatory history shows that initial allocation is typically based on past production 19 . Therefore, firm behavior is characterized here using a stylized two-period model where harvesters maximize profits and expect to receive allocations based on their historical harvests. In this extended model, anticipation of impending policy change produces a change in behavior in the current period; empirical evidence of this change is presented in Section III. 
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The first-order conditions in period one and period two are given by (14). Note the additional term "strategic effort effect" in the first-order condition for period one. 
These first-order conditions show how firms modify their behavior prior to property rights implementation in order to maximize their initial allocation. In period one, effort is increased until the marginal cost of effort equals the marginal profit of harvests plus the discounted marginal profit from the additional quota allocation in the second period. Thus the expectation that quota will be allocated based on past production increases the incentives for production.
Because quota are allocated to vessels, not firms, a firm that retires a vessel before property rights are implemented loses its claim to that vessel's harvest. Therefore, the second effect of forward-looking behavior is that the re-entry/exit condition must be adjusted to reflect the benefits of initial quota allocation. In period one, the equilibrium re-entry/exit condition includes the additional "strategic entry effect" term, which reflects the discounted value of the additional quota allocated in the period two:
The effort conditions and exit/re-entry conditions for the representative firm are summarized in TABLE 1. Notice that the difference between the naïve and forward-looking models occurs in the first period prior to the actual policy change. 
Thus we can rank the average costs of the inframarginal fishing vessel, r, and the level of effort, E, under the three states: These two models identify three important behavioral factors that must be incorporated into econometric models. First, in the period prior to policy change, vessels will increase effort in order to maximize their initial quota allocations. Second, the threshold for re-entry is lower under the forward-looking model, and so the vessels that re-enter in anticipation of policy change will be less efficient than if there is no such expectation. Third, vessels that exit after policy change will by design be the least efficient.
These factors have important implications for the empirical analysis of efficiency under the competing policies. Observed changes in mean efficiency under the two policies will be largely driven by changes in industry composition (that is, the efficiency of the inframarginal vessel). Strategic behavior in the negotiation period -primarily re-entry of particularly inefficient vessels -will upwardly bias simple estimates of change in mean efficiency. In order to assess efficiency gains across firm types -and thereby measure relative benefits from policy change -it is necessary to compare vessels that were active in both periods, correcting for sample selection.
The next section presents empirical evidence of the strategic behavior predicted in the model presented above.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
In the preceding model, strategic firm behavior prior to actual policy implementation leads to changes in industry composition, implying the need to correction for sample selection bias when evaluating the efficiency impact of tradable property rights. This section provides empirical evidence of this predicted behavior. The first sub-section measures change in production effort and change in exit/re-entry of vessels; the second sub-section shows that the vessels that re-entered the fishery during the negotiation period and those that exited immediately after policy change were significantly less efficient than those vessels that remained in the fishery. The evidence is drawn from sixteen years of input and output data from the MidAtlantic surf clam industry.
A. Changes in Effort and Vessel Re-entry
The Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery was chosen for this analysis because it has a history of innovative management and has been a touchstone in the debate over The most common allocation scheme used in fisheries at that time was to grant individual allocations in proportion to the catch history of each vessel. Therefore, while harvesters were maximizing their current profit, they expected to receive an allocation based on their catch history, as characterized in the second stylized model above. While firms were increasing harvesting effort, the threshold for vessels to re-enter the fishery was lowered. As seen in TABLE 2, the decline in the number of vessels harvesting surf clams reversed in the mid-1980s, and the number of vessels increased 23% between 1983 and 1986 and remained high until after property rights were implemented. This period also saw a shift in ownership of capital: between 1983 and 1987 the largest fishing firm increased its capital by six units to bolster its claim to future property rights. Processing firms, who could receive a property right only through ownership of harvesting vessels, also increased vessel 29 The industry means for 1984 and 1987 are 111 and 123 gross registered tons, respectively.
ownership to accumulate future property rights, the median processor acquiring an additional vessel during the negotiations and then decreasing its vessel ownership by 50% immediately after property rights were separated from vessels. The processor with the greatest number of vessels acquired four vessels prior to the policy change and decreased its vessel ownership by 75% within the first three years of tradable property rights.
B. Changes in Vessel Efficiency
The previous sub-section discusses changes in effort and in participation in the industry during property rights negotiations. To evaluate the efficiency impact of tradable property rights, however, it is necessary to establish how strategic behavior affected the efficiency of the inframarginal producer. Empirical estimates of vessel efficiency for 1984-1999 demonstrate two significant differences among vessels. First, vessels that stayed in the fishery under tradable property rights were significantly more efficient than those that exited the fishery after policy change. Second, vessels that re-entered the fishery during the negotiation period were significantly less efficient than all other vessels. This strategic behavior determines which vessels are observed in each period, affecting estimates of the change in efficiency. In order to separate the effect of strategic behavior from the effect of the new policy, the econometric model must correct for this effect 30 .
Each vessel's annual efficiency is calculated by first estimating a stochastic production function for the industry. The stochastic production function breaks the deviation from the theoretical production function into two sources, production inefficiency and white noise; it is 30 Additionally, the results imply that the allocation of property rights should take into account the strategic behavior of producers in constructing the allocation formulas so as to reduce incentive for socially inefficient behavior prior to implementation. The topic of allocating tradable property rights given forward-looking behavior is addressed in our working paper.
written as an ordinary production function with the addition of a one-sided inefficiency term, indicating the distance from the production frontier for a given vessel in each year.
31
In the surf clam fishery, the log of outputs is modeled as linear in the log of inputs (fuel, labor, and capital) and the log of the population of the resource. 32 Thus the regression equation for firm i is linear in logarithms of output (harvest, h) and inputs (fuel, labor and capital, population) and allows for inefficiency (u) and white noise (v) 33 : Despite its asymmetric distribution, the compound error term, ( ) ii vu − , can be estimated using maximum likelihood estimation 34 . The parameter γ reflects the appropriateness of using the stochastic production function over a deterministic production function 35 .
31 Disaggregating natural variation, or white noise, from the inefficiency term is particularly appealing in modeling output in an industry such as a fishery in which weather and other natural forces can cause normal variation in output. 32 The fuel input reflects distance and speed traveled. Labor is the measure of total man-hours spent harvesting. The measure of capital is the length of the vessel, a standard proxy in the fisheries economics literature. The coefficients and standard errors for the estimated stochastic production function are presented in TABLE 4 , which shows that all the parameters for the inputs chosen by the harvester (fuel, labor, length) are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 36 . The population of clams is not statistically significant, reflecting the relative stability of population Agricultural Econ. 169 (1977) . Note that γ does not have chi-square distribution because the hypothesis that it equals zero means that it is on the boundary of the parameter space. Since the restriction is on the boundary space, the distribution of the test statistics for gamma is a mixed chi-square. 36 The null hypothesis of constant returns to scale in all inputs and both vessel and resource capital (fuel, labor, population, capital) is not rejected at the 5% level.
over the entire time period. 37 The parameter γ is significant at the 1% level, implying that technical inefficiency exists in the production function and accounts for more than the variation from random white noise and that a stochastic frontier production is appropriate 38 . The importance of the parameters of the stochastic production function is in the estimation of efficiency of each vessel-year observation. To estimate the change in efficiency of an individual vessel, the efficiency score of each vessel-year was estimated. Technical efficiency is expressed as the ratio of the vessel's mean production, conditional on the observed levels of factor inputs and firm effects, to the maximum level of production, conditional on the same levels of inputs, but assuming those inputs are 37 Since the recovery of the population following the die-off of the clams in the mid-70s, both the population and total allowable harvests have been very stable. 38 The calculated likelihood ratio for γ is 325. 
Thus, the efficiency score is bounded by zero and one, and a score closer to one indicates a higher level of efficiency. TABLE 5 presents the mean efficiency scores over four categories of vessels and three time periods. The four categories of vessels are defined by their re-entry or exit decisions. "All" refers to all active vessels, regardless of re-entry/exit decision; "survivors" are vessels that continued to harvest in the fishery after the transition to tradable property rights;
"exit" includes those vessels that ceased harvesting after the policy change; and "re-entrants" are vessels that re-entered the fishery seeking to claim a share of future property rights. The three time periods are the negotiation period (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) , the tradable property rights period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , and the entire period (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . 39 Battese, G. Tim Coelli and T. Colby, Frontier Production Functions, Technical Efficiency and Panel Data: With Application to Paddy Farmers in India, 3 J. Productivity Analysis 153 (1992) . 40 Note that the total disturbance, e i , not the inefficiency term, u i , is directly observed. The inefficiency term is estimated conditional on the observable total error. The mean efficiency of all vessels under tradable property rights is 7% higher than under command and control, but this includes the effect of the shift in fleet composition. To estimate the change in mean vessel-level efficiency, we must answer two questions. First, what was the change in efficiency for vessels that harvested both before and after the transition to tradable property rights? Second, did those vessels that continued to produce under tradable property rights ("survivors") differ systematically from those vessels that exited the industry ("exit")?
As TABLE 5 shows, the average efficiency of survivors was higher under tradable property rights than under command and control 41 . In addition, the mean efficiency scores of the sub-groups (survivors, exit, and re-entrants) show systematic differences between them. During the command and control period, those vessels that would remain in the industry were more efficient that those that would exit after property rights, 42 implying that the survivor group would have remained more efficient than the exit group, regardless of the policy change.
Vessels that entered during the negotiation period (re-entrants) are significantly less efficient than any other group -as predicted by the theoretical model above. In summary, the three groups can be ranked as follows:
The change in industry composition brought on by policy negotiations had a significant effect on mean efficiency, as illustrated by the time series in FIGURE 1. The trough in mean efficiency during 1986-1988 was caused by substantial re-entry of inefficient vessels. Once quota ownership was separated from vessel ownership, there was a drastic decline in the number of vessels in the fleet, which was concurrent with an upward turn in mean efficiency after 1990.
Because vessels that exit after policy change are generally less efficient than those that remain, the attrition after the policy change (exit) is correlated with the compound error term, e i =v i -u i , producing selection bias. In addition, vessels entering the fishery during the policy negotiation period are distinguished by significantly below-average efficiency. These reentrants, therefore, downwardly bias the estimated mean efficiency level prior to policy implementation; as a result, estimates of the change in mean efficiency level will significantly overstate the true change in efficiency. To correct for this bias and estimate the distribution of efficiency gains across firm and vessel types, a regression model allowing for sample selection is presented in the next section. 42 The null hypotheses of equal means between those that exit and those that survive is rejected at the 2% significance level.
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS: DISTRIBUTION OF EFFICIENCY GAINS
Two economic goals of tradable property rights are the elimination of overcapacity and increasing the efficiency of remaining vessels. At first glance, it appears that these goals were achieved in the surf clam fishery; from 1987 to 1993, the average level of efficiency in the fishery as a whole increased by 14%, while the number of vessels harvesting decreased by 63%.
Despite these aggregate economic benefits, however, this dramatic change in the fishery created In order to isolate the effect of policy change on vessel-level efficiency, it is necessary to look at the change in efficiency for a vessel that harvested under command and control (CC) and then under tradable property rights (TPR). This change in efficiency relative to the starting efficiency is: One possibility might be to measure this growth in efficiency for the industry as a whole, or for all vessels that operated both before and after the policy change. However, the empirical 43 Vessels are categorized into size classes based on their total gross registered tonnage; firm types include independent firms, harvesters vertically integrated with processing or distribution operations, and horizontally integrated harvesters results described in the previous section indicate the potential problems with this approach.
First, the vessels that entered the industry immediately prior to the policy change were particularly inefficient. Second, vessels that remained in the industry after the policy change were significantly more efficient than those that exited after implementation. These findings demonstrate the importance of sample selection: in fact, there are several distinct groups of boats, and their relative presence in the industry shifted significantly over time. Therefore, simply applying (19) to the industry as a whole will conflate this change in industry composition with the change in vessel-level efficiency brought about by new policy. . 43 (1981) . 45 In the manufacturing sector it has been observed that small firms that have slow or negative growth are more likely to disappear from the panel than are large firms. Because of the selective attrition the growth rate of firms is observed only for those firms that do not exit over the panel. A selection model is necessary to model the relationship between firm size and growth. See Hall supra note 12. Likewise, the current paper relies on the Heckman selection model to examine the determinants of the change in efficiency. 46 By reducing the window of analysis to the years 1987-1993, we capture the significant restructuring after the policy change while reducing reduce the influence of changes in other aspects of the system. The growth in efficiency, however, is only observed for vessels that do not exit the industry. As described in the previous section, these vessels are distinct from those vessels that remain in the industry and those vessels that re-entered during negotiations. The determinants of efficiency change are vessel age (age), type of firm that owns the vessel (firm=1 for integrated, 0 for independent), and vessel size in gross registered tonnage (GRT) (size=1 for GRT>100, 0 otherwise). However, a vessel is observed under tradable property rights only if it chooses not to exit after the policy change. Another important factor in the exit decision is the age of the vessel itself. First, older vessels have increased wear and older technology, and are more likely to be retired by horizontally integrated harvesters. Second, for independent harvesters, vessel age is positively 47 The surf clam fishery has been the subject of anthropological studies of natural resource use. Coastal Mgmt. 199 (1990) .
correlated with the length of time the harvester has been in the industry, and hence older vessels are more likely to be owned by owners who are close to retirement age.
The third important driver of the exit decision is vessel profit, which has an obvious interpretation. The summary statistics for vessels are presented in TABLE 6 and TABLE 7 . Therefore the regression model is: Table 8 .
A. Results ignoring sample selection
The first set of results in Table 8 shows the coefficients and significance levels for an OLS regression of change in relative efficiency on vessel age, firm type, and vessel size 48 . The regression covers all vessels that harvested in both 1987 and 1993, and therefore includes vessels that chose not to exit over the period. In these results, the mean growth in efficiency of a new, small (≤100 GRT) vessel owned by an independent firm is 0.786, which is significant at the 1% level. The relevant interpretation of the constant is that the mean efficiency change was positive rather than negative for those vessels that remained in the industry. Overall the model explains only 4% of the variation in efficiency growth.
Of particular interest from a policy and economic perspective is whether firm integration or size of capital is related to efficiency growth. In these results, ignoring the systematic re-entry and exit of vessels, none of the other variables of interest has any explanatory power. If the disturbances of the survival equation and the growth equation are not correlated, then these 48 Note that while the efficiency score is bounded from below and above, this regression uses the growth in efficiency. Thus the variable growth is not censored, and a Tobit regression is unnecessary.
results would contradict arguments that tradable property rights systematically favor one type of harvester over another. To fully answer the question, however, it is essential is to correct for the types of firms that are in the panel, because as shown previously those vessels that exited had lower efficiency than those that did not exit, even under command and control. 
B. Results correcting for sample selection
To address the potential bias caused by less efficient vessels' strategic re-entry prior to policy change and attrition afterward, the Heckman selection model is used, with results reported in Table 8 . The first test for sample selection issues is whether the error terms of the regression equation for growth and the selection equation are correlated. The estimated correlation between the error terms is ρ=0.96 and is statistically significant at the 5% level; this result indicates that the estimates of the regression equation will be upwardly biased if sample selection is ignored.
The estimates of the selection equation suggest that contracting relationships and vessel age are the most important determinants of exit. The coefficient for the relative number of contracts is -2.944 and is statistically significant at the 1% level, the negative coefficient reflecting the importance of loyalty to processors. Tradable property rights enabled processors to ensure a regular supply of clams to match their production schedules by contracting with a smaller number of harvesters 49 . Thus, in the period of restructuring after tradable property rights were implemented, the more contracts a harvester had relative to the number of total processors, the less likely the harvester was to remain in the industry. Older vessels were also more likely to exit the industry, suggesting that fleets rationalized by eliminating older capital. The coefficient for vessel age is -0.076 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. As expected the coefficient for vessel profit is positive (107.853) and statistically significant at the 1% level.
The combined effect of sample selection is that after the implementation of tradable property rights, the remaining vessels were on average newer, contractually related to fewer processors, and more profitable. The positive and statistically significant correlation between the 49 Based on ownership of tradable quota, processors can coordinate harvests with production. Processors can also affect harvesting schedules by coordinating the leasing or provisioning of additional quota in order for the harvesters to meet the production requirement.
disturbances of the two equations suggests that the initial estimates of the change in efficiency were biased upwards, as is verified by the results in Table 8 .
Given that those vessels that stayed were more efficient on average to start with, the first question is how changes in efficiency correspond to vessel and firm traits. When correcting for the correlation between the disturbances of the survival equation and the efficiency growth equation, the mean change in the efficiency of a new, small vessel owned by an independent firm is still positive, but is smaller than estimated by the OLS model (0. 638 in the Heckman model, 0.786 in the OLS model).
In addition, these sample selection issues have important implications for the estimated relationships between growth in efficiency and characteristics of the harvester. The coefficient on age is negative (-0.069) and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that older vessels are less able to exploit the flexibility provided by the new policy to achieve efficiency gains. There are two possible explanations of this effect: either the older vessels have older captains who are less likely to adapt to new tactics rewarded by tradable property rights, or older vessels are less easily re-purposed as required by tradable property rights.
The most important policy implications are presented by the coefficients on firm structure and vessel size, because they directly address the concern that tradable property rights unfairly benefit large producers at the expense of small producers. By including both firm type and vessel size, the model captures two key issues in this equity debate. The first is the fear that tradable property rights favor large vessels over smaller ones 50 . However, the coefficient for vessel size (recall that size=1 if GRT>100, 0 otherwise) provides counterevidence of discrimination against small vessels; although positive (0.232), the size coefficient is not statistically significant (p-value=0.32).
Second is the fear that tradable property rights facilitate domination of the industry by either vertically or horizontally integrated fishing firms 51 . This concern was explicitly addressed in the national debates over property rights in US fisheries. Recall that the coefficient on firm type (firm=0 for independents, 1 for integrated firms) is not statistically significant in the OLS regression; however, in the selection model, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The implication is not only that independent firms were not unfairly damaged, but that they actually increased efficiency more than integrated firms. This negative relationship between firm integration and efficiency change highlights the importance of addressing sample selection issues.
While looking at the aggregate change in efficiency in the industry as a whole can show the scale of total benefits resulting from policy change, it leaves unanswered the fundamental and politically important issue of equity. By contrast, this model addresses this issue by estimating efficiency change on the vessel level. The results are important because they contradict the common, naïve belief that efficiency gains accrued predominately to large vessels or integrated firms. While there are potential inequities in any policy, inequities are not an inherent quality of tradable property rights, but depend on the way property rights systems are designed and implemented. And in order to accurately assess the impact of a policy change, it is necessary to carefully distinguish between its effect on industry composition and its effect on firm-level efficiency, rather than simply measuring the change in efficiency as a whole.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Economists have long recognized the theoretical benefits of replacing command-andcontrol regulation with tradable property rights in fisheries management. Not only should excess capital exit the industry, but remaining vessels should become more efficient; no longer 51 National Research Council, supra note 8.
subjected to rigorous input and output constraints, harvesters can adjust inputs and make harvesting decisions to operate at the most efficient rate. 52 Despite these seemingly clear theoretical benefits, however, tradable property rights are still far from the norm in fisheries management. In the United States, policy debates concerning market-based regulatory systems center on a single key question: who benefits? Empirical studies attempting to sort out this thorny issue must cope with the realities of the complex processes by which new policies are negotiated and implemented. Invariably, firms take advantage of the policy negotiation period to stake their claims to benefits under the new system, complicating simple before-and-after analyses that ignore firms' strategic behavior.
In the surf clam fishery, the result was that large numbers of economically inefficient vessels re-entered the industry in the final years of command-and-control regulation, seeking to establish claims to initial quota allocations that could then be used by other vessels or sold on the market. These high-cost vessels then exited the fishery once the quotas were allocated. This short-term influx of inefficient vessels made the gains due to tradable property rights seem greater than they actually were, since efficiency was artificially low in the years prior to policy change. Correcting for this distortion -by separating vessel entry and exit from changes in individual vessel efficiency -gives a more accurate picture of the benefits provided by tradable property rights.
This analysis is also critical to understanding the equity effects of tradable property rights -how gains in efficiency are distributed across different types of vessels and firms. Because this econometric model isolates vessel-level efficiency from industry structure effects, it is possible to see how different classes of vessels were affected by the new policy. The results would be surprising to many participants in the current policy debate over tradable property rights. After correcting for the effects of strategic re-entry and attrition, we found that older vessels enjoyed a smaller efficiency gain than younger vessels, which is not itself surprising. More interestingly, individual vessel size had no effect on efficiency gains, and independent firms actually benefited more than did vertically or horizontally integrated firms. These last two conclusions directly contradict the common belief that market-based regulatory systems unfairly benefit large and integrated firms at the expense of smaller, independent firms.
This example demonstrates several important points concerning the economic analysis of regulatory change. First, regulatory changes are not pure exogenous shocks, but are lengthy processes in which affected firms are intimately involved; as a result, these firms engage in strategic behavior in anticipation of new policies, clouding any assessment of their impact.
Second, this strategic behavior has its own effects on industry composition and efficiency, and must be isolated in order to measure the change in efficiency of individual firms or classes of firms. And third, this correction produces results that are significantly different from those obtained otherwise -and, in this case, results with significant impact on the current debate over tradable property rights in fisheries management. 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 
